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THE EICHMANN TRIAL, THE JEWISH QUESTION, AND
THE AMERICAN-JEWISH INTELLIGENTSIA
PNINA LAHAV*
From a Jewish point of view, two elements are inseparable from any
discussion of the Jewish problem: anti-Semitism and assimilation. For
to a Jew the problem essentially is this: how can the Jewish people
survive in the face of hostility which threatens to destroy us, and, on the
other hand, in the face of a friendliness which threatens to dissolve our
group ties and submerge us as a whole by absorbing us individually?
-Ben Halpern1
I herewith commission you to carry out all preparations with regard to
... a total solution of the Jewish question ....
-Hermann Goering
2
We have no Jewish Question in America. The only question we recog-
nize is the question of how to prevent the emergence of 'Jewish ques-
tion' here."
-Abraham Cahan3
1992 marks the thirtieth anniversary of the Eichmann trial. The Supreme
Court of Israel heard oral argument between March 22d and March 29th and
rendered an opinion sustaining the conviction on May 29th. Eichmann's peti-
tion for pardon to the President of Israel was denied; he was executed by hang-
ing on June 1st, 1962 and his remains were scattered over the Mediterranean.
* Professor, Boston University School of Law. This Essay was first presented at the
1991 Conference on Jews and the Law in the United States at the Institute for Legal
Studies of the University of Wisconsin at Madison. Thanks go to Professor M.J. Horwitz
for reading this manuscript and giving me valuable comments, to Ms. Miriam
Wugmeister for expert research assistance, and to Ms. Deborah Autor and Mr. Kevin
Royer for valuable editorial help. I also wish to acknowledge the influence of Professor
Martha Minow's book, Making All the Difference, on my thinking on these issues.
1 BEN HALPERN, THE AMERICAN JEW: A ZIONIST ANALYSIS 14 (Schocken Books
1983) (1956).
2 Letter from Hermann Goering to Reinhard Heydrich (July 31, 1941), reprinted in
part in WILLIAM L. SHIRER, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE THIRD REICH 964 (1960).
3 HALPERN, supra note 1, at 14 (quoting ABRAHAM CAHAN, Die Arbeiter Zeitung
(Dec. 5, 1890), reprinted in 2 E. TCHERICOWER, GESHIKHTE FUN DER YIDISHER
ARBETER-BAVEGUNG IN DIE FAREYNIKTE SHTATN 499-502 (1945)).
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I. THE JEWISH QUESTION
The abduction, trial, and execution of Adolf Karl Eichmann by the state
of Israel, fifteen years after the shutdown of the crematoria at Auschwitz,
challenged the American Jewish intelligentsia to confront the Jewish ques-
tion.4 What does it mean to be a Jew in America and who is an American
Jew? Is the Jewish history of anti-Semitism and the Holocaust also a part of
American-Jewish history? Is there a lesson in the destruction of European
Jewry-the triumph of anti-Semitism, the failure of assimilation-relevant
to American Jews? Is there a national component to being Jewish? Are
Jews a people? If so, is there a sovereign state, outside of America, which
might claim affinity with American Jews, a state which speaks for the Jewish
people?
The architects of the final solution treated all Jews alike. They classified
all Jews-old and young, male and female, rich and poor, liberal and con-
servative, orthodox, reform, atheist, agnostic, or baptized-as subhuman
and perceived them as threats to Gentile personhood. But all Jews were not
alike. Jews throughout the world, before, during, and after the Holocaust,
defined themselves in different ways, both in relation to Gentiles and in rela-
tion to their fellow Jews.
The Eichmann trial directly involved the two central events of Jewish his-
tory in this century: the Holocaust and the establishment of the state of
Israel. It invited, almost coerced, American Jews to take a stand and, in the
process of taking a stand, to develop whatever self-awareness they could
muster about the meaning of being a Jew as well as a citizen of the United
States. Self-awareness as a Jew had to crystallize in relation to both the non-
Jewish-American world in which they lived and in the models presented by
other Jews about the meaning of being Jewish.
How did the legal aspects of the trial affect this perception of self? The
trial systematically documented the origins, development, and application of
the German death machine. It aimed to make every Jew, however assimi-
lated, confront or suppress the idea that "there, but for the Grace of God, go
I." It invited thoughts about a common Jewish history and common Jewish
destiny regardless of one's individual preferences. It challenged American
Jews to rethink their relationship to their own government, provoking the
questions: Where was my government when the millions were murdered?'
4 This does not mean that there had been no debates about the meaning of Jewishness
among American Jews. Indeed, there had been lively debates which were both informed
and informative, but they were conducted by a small and self-selected group of people
who chose to identify themselves as Jewish and to reflect on the meaning of being Jewish
in America. They were conducted under the auspices of the several Jewish organizations
in the United States and published primarily in Judaism and Commentary. The debates
intensified following the Eichmann trial. See generally YOSEF GORNY, THE QUEST FOR
COLLECTIVE IDENTITY (1990).
1 The prosecution insisted on extensively documenting the failure of the Allies to come
to the rescue of the Jews. It noted Canadian and American willingness to shelter British
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Is there the faintest possibility that "It" could happen here? If there is a
difference, what is it?
Julius Stone, the noted Australian-Jewish professor of jurisprudence,
observed the conflict that this strategy created within his psyche. When
asked to observe the trial on behalf of the International Commission of
Jurists, he felt great resistance. Upon reflection, he discerned two powerful
forces pulling him in opposite directions. One was the duty to learn, the
other, the resistance to listen. This resistance, he observed, was rooted not
only in the natural reaction to the "details of ... inhumanity," but also in
the resentment one feels before a demonstration that "unless we are careful
we ourselves may sometimes come to similar degraded conduct."6 Stone
further observed that "[t]hese subconscious resistances are strong enough,
even if we discount the cruder sense of guilt over ungenerous immigration
policies which might have saved many who later perished, as well as the
animus of various shades of antisemitism."7 This subconscious conflict,
Stone suggested, was responsible for the effort by the international legal
community to argue against the legitimacy of the trial, saying: "I suspect
that many of the ... technical objections to the trial are merely rationaliza-
tions of our natural resistance to apprehending the details of these years of
inhumanity."8
The trial raised a number of legal issues, each potentially the basis of a
learned law review article: Could the abduction of Eichmann against his
will and the will of his host country, Argentina, undermine Israeli jurisdic-
tion? Did the territoriality principle-that criminal jurisdiction extends to
either a national or an act occurring inside the territory of the state claiming
jurisdiction-apply to the case, or could an exception be carved for the occa-
sion? Could Eichmann be held responsible for actions which were not con-
sidered criminal when done and which were recognized as crimes in
international law only ex post facto? Could a state which did not exist at the
time of the Holocaust try him? Was the Israeli judiciary capable of guaran-
teeing a fair and impartial trial? And most poignantly, from the perspective
of international law, could Israel create a category of "crimes against the
Jewish People" or would international law recognize only crimes against
humanity?
First a few words about Adolph Eichmann and the trial.
children during the Blitz, and their reluctance to rescue Jewish children. Evidence of
American responsiveness to advertisements published in Pets Magazine, calling upon
Americans to adopt pedigreed English dogs, was similarly offered, to emphasize that
Western conscience felt more for endangered dogs than for Jews in death camps.
GIDEON HAUSNER, THE HOLOCAUST IN THE MIRROR OF THE TRIAL 301 (1988).
6 Julius Stone, The Eichmann Trial and the Rule of Law, Address Before the Interna-
tional Commission of Jurists 18 (Australian Section) (July 10, 1961) (on file with the
Boston University Law Review).
7 Id.
8 Id.
19921
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II. THE EICHMANN TRIAL
Adolph Eichmann was head of Department IV B 4 in the RSHS (the
Reich security services) and in charge of Jewish Affairs and Evacuation. He
proved his excellent managerial skills first by performing the modest task of
expelling Vienna's Jews from Austria,9 then by engineering the systematic
murder of the majority of European Jewry. 10 In 1944, weeks before the Red
Army marched on Budapest, he reactivated the Auschwitz crematoria to
add 400,000 Hungarian Jews to his 5.5 million victims." After the war,
Eichmann escaped to Argentina and assumed a false identity. On May 11,
1960, as Israel was celebrating its Bat Mitzva, Israeli security agents
abducted Eichmann and brought him to face charges in Jerusalem.'
His trial was not an ordinary trial. Israeli law was amended in order to
provide that a Supreme Court justice chair the trial level three-judge panel.' 3
In order to accommodate the international media and a sizeable contingent
of interested spectators, Israel decided not to hold the trial in the usual small
and modest court building, but rather in Bet Haam, the "People's House"-
a public hall for concerts and plays. To ensure Eichmann's safety, he was
seated in a specially constructed bulletproof glass booth. A heavy police
guard surrounded the court; visitors needed permits and were thoroughly
searched before entering the building. Cameras were allowed into the
improvised courtroom, a rarity in the common law world and unprece-
dented in Israeli judicial procedure. A battery of simultaneous translators
contributed to the cosmopolitan atmosphere. The black and white decor of
the podium, enhanced by the black robes of judges and lawyers, created the
sensation of a film noir. The sterile odor of legalism, of procedural rules
dryly and meticulously applied to a defendant presumed innocent, competed
for attention alongside the agonizing picture of the Jews descending into
hell. Witnesses collapsed on the stand, unable to command memory. The
9 See Eichmann v. Attorney General (1963) (Isr.), English Translation Part III, at 11-
12 (on file with the Boston University Law Review).
10 Id. at 17-31.
11 Id. at 25.
12 TOM SEGEV, THE SEVENTH MILLION: THE ISRAELIS AND THE HOLOCAUST 307-
09 (1991) (Hebrew).
13 By law, Judge Binyamin Halevy, Chief Judge of the District Court, was to preside
over the panel sitting in judgment. In the early 1950s, however, Halevy had delivered the
opinion in the notorious Kastner trial, which addressed the question of alleged collabora-
tion of Hungary's Jewish leadership with Eichmann. See Attorney General v. Grunvald,
12(3) P.D. 2017 (1955) (Isr.). In his opinion in the Kastner case, Halevy declared that
"Kastner had sold his soul to Satan." Id. Kastner was assassinated shortly before the
Supreme Court of Israel overruled Halevy's opinion, finding that Kastner's activities did
not amount to collaboration. Substantial pressure was put on Halevy to recuse himself in
the Eichmann trial, but he refused. The Knesset therefore amended the Nazi and Nazi
Collaborators law to provide that a Supreme Court judge preside over the District Court.
Halevy did serve as one of the three judges in the Eichmann panel. Incidentally, Israel
does not have a jury system.
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audience, made up of survivors, turned itself into a chorus by defying court
orders and spontaneously challenging the defense's version of the case.
After his conviction, Eichmann was hung in the summer of 1962. He was
the first, and so far the only, person executed by the State of Israel.
Susan Sontag observed in 1964 that, above everything else, the trial was
"the most interesting and moving work of art in the past ten years." 14 A
literary critic, she perceived "[tihe function of the trial [as] . . . that of the
tragic drama: above and beyond judgment and punishment, catharsis. "15
Did the catharsis work? How did this "most interesting and moving work"
touch her as an American Jew? Sontag took care to maintain a neutral
stance. Only her characterization of the trial as "the most interesting and
moving work of art," and her observation that its legal form somehow
favored Eichmann-by casting him in the role of a defendant, as if there
were something to defend-suggested faint hints of possible personal
involvement. As a literary critic, however, she felt that the legal aspects of
the trial hindered human understanding: "the problem with the Eichmann
trial was ... the contradiction between its juridical form and its dramatic
function." 6 Sontag poignantly observed "a fundamental paradox in the
Eichmann trial: it was primarily a great act of commitment through mem-
ory and the renewal of grief, yet it clothed itself in the forms of legality and
scientific objectivity.' ' 7
Why did the Israelis insist on clothing the commitment through memory
in forms of legality and scientific objectivity?
III. THE BEN-GURION (ZIONIST) CONCEPTION OF THE JEWISH SELF
David Ben-Gurion, founder of the state of Israel and Prime Minister at
the time of the trial, offered an explanation of the Eichmann trial that chal-
lenged the American-Jewish conception of self. In an interview with the
New York Times on December 18, 1960, Ben-Gurion insisted on framing the
problem in its specific rather than abstract form."8 The Holocaust, he said,
was not about the murder of one group of people by another; it was about
the murder of all Jews. It was not simply a war crime committed during the
second world war; it was the culmination of a long history of anti-Semitism.
One could not separate the Holocaust and the historical relationship
between Gentiles and Jews. The trial was designed to expose the perennial
14 Susan Sontag, All the World's a Stage, N.Y. HERALD TRIB., Mar. 1, 1964, (Book
Week), at 1, reprinted as Reflections on the Deputy in THE STORM OVER THE DEPUTY
117, 118 (Eric Bentley ed., 1964).
15 Id.
16 Id. at 119.
17 Id.
18 See David Ben-Gurion, The Eichmann Case as Seen by Ben-Gurion, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 18, 1960, § 6 (Magazine), at 7. For an interesting discussion, see Michael Keren,
Ben-Gurion's Theory of Sovereignty: The Trial of Adolf Eichmann, in DAVID BEN-
GURION: POLITICS AND LEADERSHIP IN ISRAEL 38 (Ronald Zweig ed., 1991).
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question of anti-Semitism-and its direct relationship to the Final Solution.
For Ben-Gurion, suggestions that the Final Solution should be understood
on the abstract level of crimes against humanity, rather than against Jews as
Jews, and that an international tribunal should try the perpetrators, evi-
denced, quite simply, a conspiracy of silence--a denial of the Jewish
perspective.1 9
Ben-Gurion thus emphasized the legitimacy and centrality of the Jewish
voice and insisted on situating the Holocaust in Jewish history and Jewish
history in world history. His emphasis and insistence were reflected in his
commitment to bringing the arch-anti-Semite to the Jewish state to face Jew-
ish justice, which he felt would create a sense of empowerment and healing.
Moreover, his emphasis and insistence were ideologically rooted in the Zion-
ist disappointment with liberalism.
Liberalism, in the words voiced by Count de Clermont-Tonnerre in the
French National Assembly during the historic debate about the status of the
Jews, promised the Jews "everything as individuals" but "nothing as a
nation."2 Liberalism invited Jews to assimilate, to observe a public/private
distinction by becoming "like everyone" in the public domain while remain-
ing "Jews" at home (if they so desired). To Zionists, however, persistent
anti-Semitism and the failure of assimilation exposed the fallacy of liber-
alism. Ben-Gurion, the voice of Zionism throughout the trial, opposed the
public/private distinction, demanding recognition of the right of the Jews to
be Jews publicly, as well as privately. He believed the insistence on the cate-
gory of "crimes against humanity" rather than "crimes against the Jewish
People" revealed the insidious public/private distinction in the international
arena. Israel and the Jews were called upon to treat their Jewishness as
irrelevant in the public life of nations. Bound up within the rejection of the
category "crimes against the Jewish People," Ben-Gurion read the old lib-
eral message: "to the Jews as a nation, nothing." He interpreted the rejec-
tion as yet another liberal plot to disguise the evil of anti-Semitism with the
garb of universality and formal egalitarianism. At the same time, he saw the
call for an international tribunal-spiced as it was with skepticism about the
viability of Jewish justice-as an effort to maintain the fragmentation of a
Jewish self dependent on a machinery of justice created by others and appli-
cable to Jews only upon their concession of the irrelevance of their
Jewishness.
The Ben-Gurion, Zionist2' conception of Jewish self was a reaction to a
19 Ben-Gurion, supra note 18, at 7.
20 PATRICK GIRARD, LES JUIFS DE FRANCE DE 1789 A 1869, at 51 (1976), quoted in
Eugen Weber, Reflections on the Jews in France, in THE JEWS IN MODERN FRANCE 16
(Frances Malino & Bernard Wasserstein eds., 1981) ("We must refuse everything to the
Jews as a nation, we must grant them everything as individuals.").
21 There are many strands in Zionism, and certainly Ben-Gurion did not speak for all
of them. But I think that during the Eichmann drama he spoke for most, if not for all,
Zionists.
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liberal, Gentile self. At the same time, it involved a reaction to another Jew-
ish self, the image of the Jew in exile as perceived by Zionist ideologues.
Ben-Gurion believed that Jewish life in exile produced a subservient and def-
erential Jew, one incapable of asserting her own rights and eager to avoid
conflict with the Gentile majority, even at the cost of self-effacement, a Jew
deficient in Chutzpah. He hoped the return to Zion would produce a
"reconstructed Jew": free to develop an authentic self, able to defend her
rights, at ease about being Jewish, "normal." He saw the "normal Jew" as
one who felt about being Jewish as the English felt about being English or
the French about being French.
When confronted by the American-Jewish reservations about trying
Eichmann before an Israeli court for crimes against the Jewish people, Ben-
Gurion heard that "other" Jewish self. An opposition to Jewish empower-
ment and Jewish justice, levied by Jews, revealed that "exile mentality."
Ben-Gurion reacted:
I see it argued, by Jews among others, that Israel is legally entitled to
try Eichmann but ethically should not do so because Eichmann's crime,
in its enormity, was against humanity and the conscience of humanity
rather than against Jews as such. Only a Jew with an inferiority com-
plex could say that ....
If he were speaking today, he could describe these Jews as having false con-
sciousness, perhaps a less offensive sounding characterization. In any event,
Ben-Gurion's analysis fueled the burning controversy. Thus, American Jews
were forced to take a position, which required some conception of an
"American-Jewish" self.
IV. THE AMERICAN-JEWISH REACTION: THE LEGAL PROFESSORATE
Silence is sometimes instructive. Certainly, it is significant that not a sin-
gle major American law review has carried an article discussing the legal
issues involved in the Eichmann trial, and that other journals published for
the bar displayed only a modest interest in the matter. The American-Jew-
ish legal professorate, particularly within elite law schools, did take a stand,
but merely in conjunction with private bar events or in the popular media.
The conceptions of the Jewish self revealed by law professors, however, sug-
gest that, for reasons of either personal disposition or environmental pres-
sure, they were eager to ignore the Jewish difference. Their conceptions of
the Jewish self were probably molded by these influences. I will explore the
positions of three prominent American-Jewish professors who participated
in this debate. They were members of elite law schools, who were by and
22 Ben-Gurion, supra note 18, at 7. Responding to the charge that Eichmann should
be tried before an international tribunal, Ben-Gurion responded: "Israel does not need
the moral protection of an international court. Only anti-Semites or Jews with an inferi-
ority complex could suggest that it does. America does not need that kind of protection,
nor does England or any other country." Id.
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large accepted and respected by the American legal establishment: Milton
Katz23 of Harvard Law School, Herbert Wechsler24 of Columbia Law
School, and Yosal Rogat' of Stanford Law School.
Not surprisingly, they shared similar points of view. First, none of the
three referred to his Jewishness. This suggests that each considered his Jew-
ish self-to the extent he acknowledged one-as irrelevant to his position on
the legal issues. Second, the three considered the idea of prosecuting Eich-
mann for crimes against the Jewish people ill-conceived. This opinion, I
should add, they shared with most Jewish legal scholars outside of Israel.m
Third, they felt that the Holocaust was a catastrophe of colossal proportions
for which those responsible should be brought to justice. They differed only
on questions of process: Who had the jurisdiction to try Eichmann? What
should the charges be? Fourth, they agreed that international law on these
questions was sparse and indeterminate.
The similarities suggest that the three were children of American liber-
alism, embracing the public/private distinction, and thus orthodox in treat-
ing their Jewishness as immaterial to the debate. As children of liberalism,
they saw the Holocaust as the murder of human beings generally, not of
Jews specifically. From the liberal perspective, the category of "crimes
against the Jewish people" echoed the racist Nuremberg Laws by legally
recognizing Jews as different. This meant falling back into the illiberal Nazi
trap, using language employed by anti-Semites. It was a position they could
not stomach. Instead, they insisted on international law not differentiating
races. Being "normal," to Ben-Gurion, required recognition of differences:
e.g., that death was based upon Jewish biological descent. To Americans, by
contrast, "normal" connoted the opposite, a denial of difference.'
The indeterminate state of international law regarding the legality of the
21 See Milton Katz, Eichmann: International Problem, 32 HARV. L. REC. 9 (1961).
24 See Herbert Wechsler, The Nation's Future (NBC radio debate, Apr. 8, 1961) (on
file with the Boston University Law Review).
25 See Yosal Rogat, The Eichmann Trial and the Rule of Law (1961) (manuscript,
Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, Santa Barbara, Cal.) (on file with the
Boston University Law Review).
26 See, e.g., Stone, supra note 6, at 8 ("What may be objected to in the 1950 [Israeli]
law is the inclusion as a separate offense of the 'crime against the Jewish people.' ").
27 There exists a competing conception of the American self, which emphasizes plural-
ism. This conception was developed in the beginning of this century by the American-
Jewish philosopher Horace Kallen, among other things in order to legitimize American-
Jewish support of Zionism as harmonious with loyalty to the United States. This concep-
tion led Leon Wieseltier to theorize recently about a contrast between Jewish life in
Europe and in the United States. Whereas the "dispensation of Jewish life in Europe...
was rights" (meaning individual liberalism), "the dispensation of Jewish life in the United
States is interest. In the system of American pluralism, not only is an erasure of identity
not required for membership in the society, but its opposite came to be almost a require-
ment." Leon Wieseltier, The Competition for the Jewish Future, CONGRESS MONTHLY,
May-June 1992, at 4, 4 (alterations in original). It seems that Weiseltier's conception of
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trial, however, allowed some room for perceptions of Jewishness in the shap-
ing of arguments for or against the Israeli position. In this context, attitudes
toward the state of Israel, Jewish history, and Jewish personhood surfaced in
the debate surrounding the trial and revealed the world views of the three
scholars.
Professor Milton Katz distinguished himself among the three by defend-
ing the legality of the trial.' This required courage at the time, as most of
the American intelligentsia went the other way. In a speech before the New
Jersey Institute for Practicing Lawyers, published in the Harvard Law Rec-
ord, Katz raised the legal issue of the validity of the category of "crimes
against the Jewish people" only to dismiss it as legally irrelevant: "[T]he
specific relationship of Eichmann to the Jewish people is not an indispensa-
ble part of this case in the legal sense, although it is, of course, a vital part of
it in the actual and historical sense."' Thus, the distinction of the legal
from the actual and historical, allowed Katz to concede the significance of
Jewishness and yet sidestep the thorny issue.'
During Katz's consideration of the state of international law regarding
Israel's various bases of jurisdiction, a preliminary question arose regarding
the treatment of the state of Israel. That is, if one were to apply a principled
approach to this legal problem, and if furthermore, one were to reason by
example (as common law adjudication teaches us to do), then should one
liken Israel to England and France or should one liken it to an underdevel-
oped country? David Ben-Gurion had analogized Israel to the United States
and England when he announced that, like the United States or England,
Israel did not need the protection of an international tribunal. The ramifica-
tions of his comparison placing Israel in the First World were clear: Israel
was a part of the advanced western world, possessed a highly developed legal
system, and was as capable of delivering due process as any other country
similarly classified. Israel desired international recognition as a normal
state, as one equally entitled to apply the reach of the territoriality principle
in specific cases. Professor Katz accepted Israel's claim to a high position in
the hierarchy of states. His arguments for the validity of Israel's claims
involved examples of similar behavior by France or the United States,
implicitly recognizing Israel as a member of the First World. This stance
the American Jewish self is limited to those consciously Jewish, and certainly was not
descriptive of the Jewish law professors of the 1960s.
I See Katz, supra note 23, at 14 (observing "a body of precedent which goes back at
least to the eighteenth century, to the effect that certain crimes, abuses of behavior in time
of war ... may be punished by any state anywhere at any time").
29Id. at 9.
s He did, however, express disagreement with the category of "crimes against the
Jewish people" at the end of his speech as "unwise," because it could be used by other
nations to protect minorities outside of their territories. Still, no mention of the Jewish
issue was made in the context of that argument. Id. at 9, 16.
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may have formed the ground for his initial sympathy with the Israeli claim
and reinforced his professional judgment about its validity.
Professor Herbert Wechsler was of a different mind. Wechsler, employing
his famous "neutral principles" approach, made the following analogy:
No one would doubt the point if Spain should undertake to legislate
respecting crimes against Catholics or Ghana should presume to deal
with crimes against "the Negro people," if such crimes were not com-
mitted in their borders. Neither the State of Israel nor the Jews can be
acknowledged to present a special case."1
Thus, Wechsler argued that the Holocaust was not a "crime against the Jew-
ish people," but rather a war crime against humanity. Moreover, he consid-
ered Jewishness as unlike "Americanness" or "Englishness," for no one
would raise the issue if the United States protected Americans abroad, or if
England protected its subjects. Instead, Jewishness more closely resembled
skin color or cross-national faiths, something very personal, which should be
treated as utterly irrelevant by international law.
Still, Wechsler's points of reference-Catholics in Franco's Spain and
blacks in Nekhruma's Ghana-may reveal deeper yearnings: to be like
white Anglo-Saxon Protestants. If the latter was Wechsler's reference
group, and this affected his own conception of self, then the Israeli insistence
on representing the Jews and on regarding the Holocaust as a tragedy that
befell all Jews, probably proved most irritating to him.
My reading of Wechsler's remarks suggests that he was so irritated with
Israel's claim for representation of world Jewry, that he momentarily aban-
doned his commitment to neutral principles (the remarks were made in a
public debate). When Wechsler addressed the question of applying universal
jurisdiction in cases analogous to piracy, for example-the question of
whether Israel could legitimately prosecute Eichmann for crimes against
humanity rather than against the Jewish people--he held Israel to a stan-
dard which he probably would not have applied to his native United States.
He asserted that Israel could apply the principle of universal jurisdiction
only if it would submit itself to such jurisdiction, for its own "war crimes,"
such as the creation of the Arab refugee problem and the massacres in Kibya
and Kfar Kassem.' 2 Wechsler did not volunteer an opinion as to whether
31 Wechsler, supra note 24.
32 Between 600,000 and 760,000 Palestinian Arabs became refugees during the 1948
war. BENNY MORRIS, THE BIRTH OF THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEE PROBLEM, 1947-
1949, at 298 (1987). Skirmishes along the Jordanian/Israeli border in 1952 led to the
Israeli policy of "retaliation." In 1953, the Jordanian village of Kibya was destroyed and
69 residents were killed in a retaliatory attack led by a young officer, Ariel Sharon. It is
not clear that the government of Israel had authorized this action. According to Shabtai
Tevet, the soldiers believed that the houses they demolished were empty. Following the
incident, specific instructions were issued to prevent repetition. SHABTAI TEVET, MOSHE
DAYAN: THE SOLDIER, THE MAN, THE LEGEND 394-95 (1972). The Kfar Kassem (the
village of Kassem) incident took place on the eve of the Sinai Campaign (Israel's invasion
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the requirement of "clean hands" should apply universally, or whether the
Nuremberg tribunal met that standard.
The difference between Wechsler's and Katz's analyses on this issue is
revealing. Both subscribed to the jurisprudence of neutral principles and a
"detached, dispassionate"' 3 approach to legal matters. Katz, however, scru-
pulously adhered to neutrality, treating all states alike, refusing to pierce the
veil of sovereignty to consider internal affairs. Wechsler, on the other hand,
agreed to bend the rules when it came to Israel and endeavored to expose it
for what he believed it to be: a law breaking, vulgar third world state unwor-
thy of noble neutrality.
Katz's strictly abstract approach, then, worked in favor of the Israeli case,
whereas Wechsler's more contextual one potentially challenged the legiti-
macy of the trial. Wechsler's contextualism, however, was reserved for the
activities of the state of Israel, and did not extend to the Nazi death machine
in Europe. There, he remained loyal to an abstract understanding of reality.
His description of the Holocaust suggests that crimes were committed
against "nationals of Jewish faith" who should not be regarded as Jews qua
Jews, but rather as individuals who happened also to be of a Jewish faith.
He saw the Holocaust as "a war crime and a crime against humanity as well
as a crime against the law of the states where the offense was perpetrated, in
which the victims were Jewish people."'  His position reveals his internal-
ization of the nineteenth century liberal slogan: "to the Jews as individuals
everything; to the Jews as a nation nothing." He denied the significance of
the Jewish question in America, as well as in Europe. Thus, as the interna-
tional significance of anti-Semitism was ignored, Jews assimilated into their
respective nationalities and retained the Jewish faith as a private matter.
into Sinai, in concert with France and England) on October 29, 1956 in the context of a
military curfew imposed on Arab villages. Israel's border police shot and killed 47 resi-
dents of Kfar Kassem for allegedly violating curfew orders. It was clear that the villagers
did not know and could not have known about the curfew. The perpetrators were con-
victed by a military court, and their defense of obedience to orders was rejected. By 1959
all convicts were released from jail (either through parole or presidential pardon). One
paragraph from the opinion of the military court, delivered by Judge Binyamin Halevy,
see supra note 13, has become a landmark of Israeli legal justice:
An illegal order-has a black flag flying above it, like a warning "Thou shalt not."
What is important here is not formal illegality, covert or half covert, not an illegality
recognizable by legal minds, but rather: an open and explicit illegality evident on the
face of the order ... an illegality which punctures the eye and upsets the heart ....
YIGAL ELAM, THE EXECUTORS 59 (1990) (author's translation from original Hebrew).
In the propaganda war between Israel and the Arab world, particularly during the
1960s, assertions that Israel had created the Palestinian refugee problem or references to
the Kfar Kassem or Kibya massacres out of context, were considered by Israelis as well
as by the American-Jewish establishment as hostile to the Israeli side and therefore to the
Jewish State.
33 Wechsler, supra note 24.
4 Id.
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Wechsler apparently attained a high degree of assimilation, a conception
of self identifying thoroughly with the "American" image, which permitted
him to treat Jewishness as superficial, a mere accident of history with no
particular importance. That was perhaps what Yosal Rogat aspired to do,
but did not fully attain. The Stanford law professor offered a complex and
very thoughtful analysis of the cultural meaning of the trial. 5 He under-
stood Israel's attempt in the Eichmann trial "to galvanize all Jews into a
tensed self-consciousness of their heroic destiny"' and tensely resisted the
invitation. Like Wechsler, he thought that Israel should refrain from trying
Eichmann. He did not, however, share Wechsler's indifference to the ques-
tion of Jewish identity. Rather, he devoted an entire section of his essay to
the issue of "Jewishness"-a term he placed within quotation marks-in
which he tried to demolish that "anguished intensity and mystic exclusivity
which have historically been part of Jewish specialness."' Jewish history,
from the time of slavery in Egypt onward, he explained, was but a series of
agonizing and painful events. Individual Jews were socialized to internalize
a "demoralizing" outlook, and were thereby trapped in the notion that "they
cannot themselves choose because they were chosen."'8 This notion of the
Jewish self was rooted in a world view which stressed "traditional authority
and commandments against individual conscience; group bonds against per-
sonal commitments; social duties rather than individual rights; and ... sub-
mission to the world against modem attempts to master it." Rogat,
however, considered this world view "archaic," "primitive," and "tribal."
He believed that it had been totally refuted by social science' and replaced
by modernity:
Today... we have begun to think that the self, also, is an artifact. We
are told that we cannot fall back onto any human essence, but can only
create ourselves by our own decisions and commitments .... By the
very act of holding the trial... Israel undertakes an aggressive defense
of the last and most crucial bastion besieged by modernity-the self. It
denies that personal identity can be created by individual action and
freedom; and asserts that it can only be discovered by understanding
one's own tradition. 4'
Why was the state of Israel locked in a battle with the modern conception
of self? According to Rogat, Jews everywhere, including Israelis, were liber-
ating themselves from their "special and essentially mystical conception of
31 Rogat, supra note 25, at 6-22.
36 Id. at 18.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 19.
39 Id. at 20-21.
40 Id. at 18-20.
41 Id. at 21.
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• . . nature and mission," a development which the leadership of Israel
could not accept.
Rogat offered a new conception of self to the modem emancipated Jew.
This Jew did not seek shelter in the "American" (or any other national) self.
Rather, a Jew should seek cosmopolitanism, in which one "can determine
for [oneself] the nature and the meaning of ... Jewishness and of [one's]
relation to Jewry."'  He conceded the difficulty of this task: "[t]o acknowl-
edge this necessity is to take on a dispiriting burden of freedom, for we can
call on the assistance of only our own resources, and they are meager."" He
did not explain why this dispiriting experience was an improvement over the
collectivist bonds of special destiny, nor did he have to, because he believed
it to be the inevitable way of the future. He did make it clear, however, that
he preferred the new, emancipated, detached, "rootless, cosmopolitan, and
atomized" Jew to the "older" one.45 It is tempting to speculate that Rogat
envisioned "the Jew as spectator," similar to the role that he attributed to
Oliver Wendell Holmes, the other subject of his scholarly interests during
the same time.'
Rogat's and Ben-Gurion's understandings of the Zionist interpretation of
Jewishness were like ships passing in the night. Rogat viewed Israel as a
mere continuation of the tribal attributes of collectivity, one more link in the
old Jewish chain. Ben-Gurion understood Zionism as revolution, defiance of
the "old Jewish existence," a belief that the Jews can take destiny into their
own hands and transform it.47 Ben-Gurion's Zionist model diagnosed root-
lessness and alienation as symptoms of the disease of Jewish existence in
exile, an existence of soul without body. Zionism hailed rootedness, prefera-
bly in Zion, as a precondition to solving the Jewish problem, as essential to
the normalization of the Jewish people. Rogat perceived rootedness as pre-
modem and doomed to failure.
Yet, almost malgre lui, Rogat shared with Ben-Gurion the belief that Jews
are different. Ben-Gurion wished to overcome the difference, however, by
making the Jewish people a normal nation, like all others. Rogat, on the
other hand, wished to purge the difference by turning the Jew into a cosmo-
4 Id. at 18. Rogat added:
The Jewish identity of American Jews, for example, always precarious, is rapidly
disappearing under an onslaught of bland good-will, tolerance, and anti-anti-Semi-
tism. Many of the New Israeli(s] are rejecting the anguished intensity and mystic
exclusivity which have historically been part of Jewish specialness. They enjoy a
simple, and disconcertingly sunny and ordinary, aggressive Israeli nationalism.
Id.
43 Id.
44Id. at 21.
45 Id. at 22.
41 See Yosal Rogat, The Judge as Spectator, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 213 (1964).
47 Reconstruction of the Jewish person and of Jewish peoplehood was at the core of
Zionist ideology. See generally SHLOMO AVINERI, THE MAKING OF MODERN ZIONISM:
THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE JEWISH STATE (1981).
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politan citizen. Viewing cosmopolitan rootlessness and alienated selfhood as
the trends of the future, Rogat hoped that Jews would become pioneers in
the cosmopolitanization of nations until perhaps the national boundaries
separating them would wither away. In this sense, Rogat and Ben-Gurion
shared yet another understanding of Jewishness: both believed that the
"house of Israel" should be a light unto the nations-Ben-Gurion explicitly,
in his utopian vision of the communitarian society;" Rogat implicitly, in his
individualist vision of the cosmopolitan society.
Of course, all of this is reading between the lines. Rogat did not con-
sciously advocate a "Jewish difference." Explicitly, he acknowledged only
that the Eichmann trial provoked "extreme discomfort and embarrass-
ment."'49 He wrote that both Jews and non-Jews shared these feelings. The
Jewish sense of discomfort and embarrassment, however, was not like that
experienced by non-Jews. The embarrassment that he thought "modem"
Jews were experiencing was indicative of his own internal struggling. Rogat
had not managed to liberate himself from the gripping power of the family,
and he therefore could not bear the spectacle of the family showing its old,
primitive kishkes in public. He shared this feeling of shame with the woman
who, more than any other, kept the bonfire of the Eichmann trial burning at
least in New York City-Hannah Arendt.
V. HANNAH ARENDT IN JERUSALEM
Hannah Arendt's impressions of the Eichmann Trial were first published
in The New Yorker and then as a book, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on
the Banality of Evil.' ° Her writings served as an epilogue to the drama of the
Eichmann trial and shaped the catharsis it propelled. While the three law
48 The antinomy between normalization (a nation like all nations) and the concept of
the chosen people destined to bring light unto the nations is indeed a paradox in Zionist
ideology.
49 Rogat, supra note 25, at 19. Although the paragraph discussing this "extreme dis-
comfort and embarrassment" mentions non-Jews, it proceeds to explain the feeling in
Jewish terms, thereby suggesting that Rogat had the Jews in mind and only added the
non-Jews for purposes of universalizing the argument:
The extreme discomfort and embarrassment the trial has provoked in Jews and
non-Jews alike measures both the partial success of this attempt to assert an older
view of the relation of the individual to the group and the strength of the forces it
seeks to overcome. Attitudes toward the conflict between a traditional Jewish com-
munity and the detached, emancipated Jew may determine, therefore, especially
among Jews, the view taken of the trial. Its wisdom may seem doubtful if it is con-
sidered possible and desirable for the individual Jew to arrive at his own conclusions
about Jewishness. On the other hand, it can seem a uniquely apt device to bring out
the futility and perversity of any such attempt; to demonstrate to the individual that
his membership in the group is given to him, and not created by him.
Id.
50 HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF
EVIL (Penguin Books 1979) (1963).
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professors discussed above wrote prior to the trial, Arendt's work followed
it. She rekindled the controversy and ignited what was termed a" 'collective
psychoanalysis'" among the New York Jewish Intelligentsia.5 '
By the time Eichmann was transferred to Israel, Arendt had lost her inter-
est in Jewish affairs,52 had restored her relationship with Martin Heideg-
ger, and was rapidly making a name for herself in the United States as a
major political theorist. The idea of a trial, however, uncorked her old feel-
ings. She wrote: "To attend this trial is somehow, I feel, an obligation I owe
my past," and "I missed the Nuremburg Trials, I never saw these people in
the flesh, and this is probably my only chance."' From the beginning, then,
she acknowledged a degree of involvement that none of the law professors
claimed or could claim.'
51 ELISABETH YOUNG-BRUEHL, HANNAH ARENDT: FOR LOVE OF THE WORLD 349
(1982) (quoting a letter to Arendt from her friend Hans Morgenthau describing the
frenzy that Arendt's ideas had caused).
52 Id. at 291. In 1953, Arendt declined an invitation to write about the Kibya massa-
cre saying: "I do not want to have anything to do with Jewish politics any longer." Id.
The Kibya massacre was one of the incidents Herbert Wechsler pointed to as proof of
Israeli lawlessness. Wechsler, supra note 24.
5 The noted philosopher Martin Heidegger joined the National Socialist Party in 1933
and remained a dues-paying member until the end of World War II. For attempts to
explain his Nazi past, see MARTIN HEIDEGGER AND NATIONAL SOCIALISM (Gunther
Neske & Emil Kettering eds. & Lisa Harries trans., 1990).
54 YOUNG-BRUEHL, supra note 51, at 329 (quoting Arendt's letters to Vassar College
and to the Rockefeller Foundation, respectively, explaining her reasons for changing
prior engagements).
5 Like Rogat, Arendt experienced embarrassment and discomfort, but hers came not
from the exposure of naked Jewish tribalism but rather from internal Jewish prejudices.
According to Elisabeth Young-Bruehl, "[t]he prosecutor, Gideon Hausner, continually
annoyed and embarrassed Arendt. She described him ... with more than a little German
Jewish disdain: 'Galician Jew ... speaks without periods or commas ... like a diligent
schoolboy . . .ghetto mentality.'" Id. at 331. In Eichmann in Jerusalem, she com-
plained that the translations from Hebrew to German during the trial were "sheer com-
edy, frequently incomprehensible." ARENDT, supra note 50, at 3.
In Arendt's Republic of Weimar, where she grew up and studied philosophy with Mar-
tin Heidegger and Karl Jaspers, the ethnic divide between German and Eastern Jews was
visible and the sense of German superiority firm. Her naturalization in the United States
did not dissolve these distinctions which, for her, were reflexive. YOUNG-BRUEHL, supra
note 51, at 3-41. In Jerusalem, she was flabbergasted not only by banality of the Nazis,
but also by the prominence of the Ostyuden (Eastern Jews). The State that claimed
monopoly over Jewish representation, that claimed to represent her, was dominated by
(Jewish) Galicians and Litvaks and Poles and Russians, whom she was raised to see as
inferior to herself. Worse still, they, rather than German Jews, were chosen to translate
the Hebrew into German. ARENDT, supra note 50, at 3.
Arendt revealed a phenomenon that an American Jew growing up after World War II
would only dimly be aware of: there are different types of Jews, and these types were
shaped by, among other things, the particular ethnic environment within which they
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Arendt did not argue against the result of this judicial process. She con-
cluded, in fact, that Eichmann "must hang," but she disagreed with the
court's reasoning. She found that the Jerusalem court failed to "com[e] to
grips with three fundamental issues... : the problem of impaired justice in
the court of the victors; a valid definition of the 'crime against humanity';
and a clear recognition of the new criminal who commits this crime."57
Arendt found that "justice was more seriously impaired in Jerusalem than
it was at Nuremberg, because the court did not admit witnesses for the
defense," and further argued that an international tribunal should have been
established which included neutral countries.' She faulted the Israeli court
for not insisting that the crime against humanity was "more than a crime
against the Jewish or the Polish or the Gypsy people, that the international
order, and mankind in its entirety, might have been grievously hurt and
endangered."' 9 Finally, she criticized the court for not recognizing in the
Nazi a new criminal, one who is "neither perverted nor sadistic," but rather
"commits his crimes under circumstances that make it well-nigh impossible
for him to know or to feel that he is doing wrong."'  On this last issue, she
insisted that "civilized jurisprudence prided itself ... [most] on ... taking
into account ... the subjective factor" of mens rea."1 But the Nazis formed
a new category of criminals, men and women who did not possess mens rea.
This new category, she insisted, had to be recognized as a matter of law.62
Each of Arendt's objections reflected a desire to purge the Jewish factor
from the events of the Holocaust. Her insistence on including neutral par-
ties in the panel of judges ignored the Zionist viewpoint that there were no,
and could be no, neutral parties in this matter.63 In the European theater of
operations during World War II, neutrality had meant passive complicity
with the Nazi agenda, and for Jews "neutrality in hindsight" was simply not
good enough to qualify as justice.' The call for accentuating the idea that
grew up. Arendt's conception of Jewish self, as well as Ben-Gurion's conception, is
important for an understanding of the American-Jewish perception: it is a conception of
Jewish self that is informed by forces and cultures outside of the American pale.
56 ARENDT, supra note 50, at 279.
57 Id. at 274.
58 Id. at 274-76.
59 Id. at 276.
6 Id.
61 Id. at 277.
62 Id. at 277-79.
63 In fact, Arendt should have known this from personal experience, both from her
efforts with the Zionist organizations on behalf of stateless Jewish refugees in Paris during
the 1930s, and from the lifesaving entry visas into the United States for herself, her hus-
band, and her mother which were obtained by Jewish organizations in America on the
basis of her Zionist connections. YOUNG-BRUEHL, supra note 51, at 102-06.
14 Arendt's insistence that "justice was ... seriously impaired" because witnesses for
the defense would not come to testify before an Israeli court is another example of her
failure to recognize the centrality of the Jewish factor in the Holocaust. Requiring these
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these crimes assaulted the international order and mankind in its entirety'
similarly ignored the context of the Holocaust, where neither mankind nor
the international order came to the rescue until it was too late for the major-
ity of European Jews. From the Jewish perspective, at least as seen by Ben-
Gurion, no international justice was possible until the Jewish story was fully
told, by Jews, to Jewish judges.' But these objections were not new; they
appeared in different versions in both Wechsler's and Rogat's objections to
the trial.
It was Arendt's final objection, the lack of mens rea and the idea of the
new criminal that, combined with the previous two, stung her Jewish audi-
ence. Arendt wished to understand the Holocaust not in terms of "the Jew-
ish Question"-i.e., in terms of anti-Semitism-but rather in terms of the
rise of totalitarianism. She wished to show how, when the state destroys
society, a new type of person is created, a person "terribly and terrifyingly
normal."67 This interpretation touched a raw nerve among some Jews. The
architects of the final solution had portrayed the Jews as non-human, not-
normal, in order to legitimize genocide. To the Jews, justice in the Eich-
mann trial meant reclaiming normalcy. If they were normal it only seemed
logical that those who deprived them of their normalcy were themselves
abnormal, hence monstrous.' The Zionist conception of justice required a
witnesses would have made a trial impossible because the witnesses would not come
before an Israeli court for fear of risking their own prosecution.
6 In fact, Arendt grossly overstated the case. While the prosecution and the district
court did emphasize the charge of crimes against the Jewish people, the Israeli Supreme
Court devoted the bulk of its opinion to the argument that crimes against humanity were
perpetrated. See Eichmann v. Attorney General (1963) (Isr.), English Translation Part I
(on file with the Boston University Law Review).
I Indicting Eichmann before a Jewish Court in Israel will fill some inhuman void
that has been hidden somewhere in Jewish existence and the stories of its lives and
deaths since it went into exile to this day .... [W]ith the capturing and future trial
of the one who spilled the people's blood, Israel appears before the Jewish people, for
the first time, as the one who decides upon the validity of laws thereby replacing the
void which was reflected from the cracks of Jewish history until now. The State of
Israel will not let this trial out of its hands and will not deliver it to others. It will sit
to judgment and its soul sobriety, and its nerves iron-clad and its renewed sover-
eignty would have no better justification than the scales of justice which it holds in
its hand this time.
NATHAN ALTERMAN, The Scales of Justice, reprinted in 2 THE SEVENTH COLUMN 497,
499-500 (1981) (author's translation). Alterman was one of Israel's major poets and was
close to Ben-Gurion. The article appeared in Davar, the then-ruling party's daily news-
paper, in response to international criticism of Israeli jurisdiction.
67 ARENDT, supra note 50, at 276.
I try once again to follow a logic that isn't mine. For an orthodox Nazi it must
have been obvious, definitive, clear that all Jews should be killed: that was a dogma,
a postulate. Also the children, of course: also and especially pregnant women, so
that no future enemies should be born. But why, during the furious roundups in all
the cities and villages of their boundless empire, why violate the houses of the dying?
Why go to the trouble of dragging them onto their trains, take them to die far away,
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reversal of the Nazi conception of the Jew. If the Nazis defined the Jews as
non-human and, therefore, unworthy of life, the Zionists regarded the Nazis
as abnormal for not treating the Jews as human. From this perspective,
Arendt's position was perceived as an insult to the Jewish struggle to be
accepted as human, normal, a part of humanity.
In hindsight, it seems that the Israeli insistence on traditional justice
(albeit processed by Jews) had to do precisely with the yearning to restore
the status quo ante, before the Jew was expelled from civic society and
turned into free prey. To accomplish this, it was important to apply the
criminal law as it traditionally had existed in civilized society. Any other
process, any recognition of a new criminal and a new or "objective" crime,
would mean that the Jews were not entitled to the same safeguards as every-
one else.
The denial of mens rea, the idea of the banality of evil in the context of the
European inferno, itself seemed "word and thought defying." 9 Those who
saw themselves as participants in the ordeal of remembering understood her
to mean that the memories were banal, that the pain had a banal quality to
it. To these readers, the term "banality of evil," read together with Arendt's
statement that "[o]n trial are his deeds, not the suffering of the Jews,"7 and
her open contempt for the evidence presented at the trial-what she called
" 'the right of the witnesses to be irrelevant' "71-meant only one thing:
Arendt, who called upon them to de-demonize and to normalize the Nazi,
failed to humanize her own kin.
Was this another version of the French-liberal "to the Jews as a nation
nothing, to the Jews as individuals everything? ' 72 Or, was there some latent
hostility for Jewish attributes? Arendt provided much ammunition for this
latter charge. She pried open, with the crudest of instruments, the most
after a senseless journey, to die in Poland on the threshold of the gas chambers? In
my convoy there were two dying ninety-year-old women, taken out of the Fossoli
infirmary: one of them died en route, nursed in vain by her daughters. Would it not
have been simpler, more "economical," to let them die, or perhaps kill them in their
beds, instead of adding their agony to the collective agony of the transport? One is
truly led to think that, in the Third Reich, the best choice, the choice imposed from
above, was the one that entailed the greatest affliction, the greatest waste, the great-
est physical and moral suffering. The "enemy" must not only die, he must die in
torment.
PRIMO LEVI, THE DROWNED AND THE SAVED 120 (1988).
69 YOUNG-BRUEHL, supra note 51, at 367. Once in Jerusalem, her biographer tells us,
Arendt was startled by the realization that Eichmann was "not even sinister." Id. at 329.
A mental process of cura posterior, of healing, of changing her attitude toward the past
had begun. She no longer saw the Nazis as representatives of "radical evil." Rather, in
Eichmann she saw the prototype of the "new criminal," full of superficiality and empti-
ness, full of the "banality of evil." See id. at 367-69.
70 ARENDT, supra note 50, at 5.
71 Id. at 225 (quoting inscription found at the Yad Vashem museum in Jerusalem,
Israel).
72 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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sensitive issue of Jewish behavior during the Holocaust. She who made
questions of relevance so crucial to her argument insisted almost obsessively
on accusing the Jews, all Jews, and particularly the Jewish leadership:
"[T]here was no distinction between the highly assimilated Jewish communi-
ties of Central and Western Europe and the Yiddish-speaking masses of the
East.... [Everywhere] Jewish officials could be trusted to [cooperate in the
destruction of their own communities].""3 This, she said, was "undoubtedly
the darkest chapter in the whole dark story., 74 The prosecution, as Arendt
correctly pointed out, tried to treat this issue as irrelevant. On trial was the
Nazi, not the Jew.75
Arendt, who called upon the world to recognize the "new criminal" was
not prepared to recognize a "new victim." From the Jews she expected con-
ventional, rational behavior. It seemed that, after aptly applying the virtu-
oso methodology to the Nazi phenomenon, none remained with which to
analyze Jewish behavior, in all of its "word and thought defying" complex-
ity. For this lack of compassion and mercy, lack of what Gershom Scholem
called "Herzenstakt,"'76 Arendt was labeled a self-hating Jew.
The self-hating Jew is another, quite familiar, portrait in the gallery of
Jewish selves which emerged during the Eichmann trial and its aftermath:
the Jew who insisted that the Holocaust was mostly, if not completely, the
fault of the Jews. This characterization hit the American-Jewish community
like an electric shock. What Jews suddenly discovered was that non-self-
hating voices did not have the same access to the marketplace of ideas as did
self-hating voices, like that of Arendt.
This discovery prompted Irving Howe to observe that the intellectual
press in the United States was partial to ideas free of Jewishness. In an
article entitled "The New Yorker" & Hannah Arendt, published in Commen-
tary,77 Howe observed that The New Yorker magazine was not an open
forum welcoming different Jewish points of view. Only Arendt's interpreta-
tion was accepted for publication and thus allowed to influence "[h]undreds
of thousands of good middle-class Americans."7 ' The other "Jewish" point
73 ARENDT, supra note 50, at 118.
74 Id. at 117.
11 There was a reason for the prosecution's strategy. In the 1950s, Israeli society was
torn apart by a spectacular libel trial involving Rudolf Kastner, the leader of the Jewish
community in Hungary. After the district court held that "Kastner had sold his soul to
Satan" (i.e., Eichmann), thereby accepting at least partially Arendt's view of the role of
the Jewish leadership (although Arendt would disagree that Eichmann was satanically
evil), Kastner was assassinated. The Supreme Court of Israel exonerated Kastner, post-
humously. One purpose of the Eichmann trial was to heal the societal rift, end the self-
blame, and focus on what the Nazis had done rather than on how the Jews might have
collaborated.
76 YOUNG-BRUEHL, supra note 51, at 337.
77 Irving Howe, "The New Yorker" & Hannah Arendt, COMMENTARY, Oct. 1963, at
318.
78 Id. at 319.
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of view was confined to Commentary or similar fora; The New Yorker did
not find an intellectual or public interest in a defense of Jewish behavior
during the Holocaust, or in a defense of the relevance of the Jewish question
to the Final Solution. Thus, the choice of The New Yorker, and vicariously
of the American intelligentsia, confirmed the existence of the Jewish ques-
tion in America.
CONCLUSION
In his book The American Jew: A Zionist Analysis, first published in 1956,
Ben Halpern observed that American Jewishness had two distinct character-
istics: First, "American Jews never faced directly the whole historic com-
plex of problems, centering around Emancipation as a traumatic event, from
which modem Jewish ideologies arose." Second, "American Jewish ideolog-
ical development may still not really have begun."
'79
The Eichmann trial has modified both features. As a distinct American-
Jewish ideology has begun to emerge, American Jews have come to recog-
nize the history of European Jewry as a part of their own history. American
Jews, some willingly and some less so, have begun to absorb the history of
the Holocaust as a part of their own, Jewish, history. From this perspective,
the Eichmann trial was a great success. Also, the state of Israel acquired
further legitimacy as a kind of "insurance policy," the guarantee that in the
event of a "next time," Jews would have some shelter. The 1967 (Six Day)
war, coming as it did on the heels of the Eichmann trial and the controversy
surrounding Arendt's book, reinforced these themes. The anxiety preceding
the war was exacerbated because of Holocaust imagery, made so vivid dur-
ing the trial. The swift victory seemed to wipe out (once and for all?) the
shame created by the "passive" death of the six million Jews. Finally, Israel
was no longer viewed as a third world country. Even distinguished Ameri-
can law professors started to visit it regularly. American-Jewish ideology
was developing around two main pillars: remembrance of the Holocaust and
commitment to the state of Israel.
In terms of the construction of the Jewish self, however, the Eichmann
trial had some unforeseen consequences. Jews came to define themselves in
reaction to catastrophe. The acceptance of the Holocaust as the pivotal
event in Jewish history seemed to dwarf everything else that was historically
Jewish. It confirmed Yosal Rogat's view that Jewishness is about pain and
suffering and little else.' The Holocaust, which has been popularized and
79 HALPERN, supra note 1, at 26-27.
80 So strong was the influence that even Nazi vocabulary infiltrated Jewish parlance.
For example, right wing Israelis and their supporters in the United States frequently
accuse the Palestinians of wanting the occupied territories to be "yudenrein" (free of
Jews). Left wing Israelis and their supporters in the United States frequently accuse
Israel's government as being motivated by "lebensraum" (a need for greater living space).
This phenomenon has been extensively documented in Israel. See, e.g., Danny Ruben-
stein, Israelis and the Holocaust, POLITIKA, June-July 1986, at 18 (Hebrew).
THE JEWISH QUESTION
commercialized, sometimes vulgarized, since the Eichmann trial, has come
to emphasize being Jewish in terms of being the target of persecution. Ques-
tions about the meaning of being Jewish, particularly the question about the
meaning of Jewishness after the Enlightenment (the ideals of egalitarianism
and universalism), and its relationship to the notion of Am Sgula (the partic-
ularity of the Jewish phenomenon) faded into the margins.
All four scholars examined in this essay-Katz, Wechsler, Rogat, and
Arendt-seem to have defined their Jewish selves in reaction to, and in nega-
tion of, some concept of Jewishness "out there." They denied that there was
a Jewish difference worthy of exploration, at least not in the context of the
meaning of justice. In so doing, they attempted to follow the cardinal princi-
ple of liberalism and of Jewish emancipation-to abandon particularism in
favor of universalism. In the aftermath of the Eichmann trial, we have wit-
nessed a reversal, at least in some Jewish circles, of this phenomenon. The
"Jewish difference" often seems defined by the particularism of persecution.
In their conception of an American-Jewish self, both phenomena are com-
pletely Jewish. Jewish history has known both the one who denies all rele-
vance of Jewishness, who wishes to merge with "the other" (whoever that
other might be), and the one who erects a wall between himself or herself
and the Gentile world. But there are other notions of Jewishness. Notions
which develop in relation to some positive conception of Gentile selfhood
while simultaneously acknowledging the significance of Jewish culture for
the Jewish person. I do not mean to say that there is one "correct" defini-
tion of being Jewish. In fact I do not think there is one. Jewish history and
culture is a gallery which contains a wide range of conceptions of selfhood. I
only mean to say that the conceptions of self, anchored in the belief that
there is no Jewish question in America, or that the Jewish question is only
about survival, are impoverished versions, requiring too much negative
energy and permitting too little critical assessment.
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